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ABSTRACT
This paper looks more closely at the sources of patent growth in the United States since 1984. It
confirms that the increase is largely due to US patenters, with an earlier surge in Asia, and some
increase in Europe. Growth has taken place in all technologies, but not in all industries, being
concentrated in the electrical, electronics, computing, and scientific instruments industries. It then
examines whether these patents are valued by the market. We know from survey evidence that
patents in these industries are not usually considered important for appropriability, but are
sometimes considered necessary to secure financing for entering the industry. I compare the market
value of patents held by entrant firms to those held by incumbents (controlling for R&D). Using data
on publicly traded firms 1980-1989, I find that in industries based on electrical and mechanical
technologies the market value of entrants' patents is positive in the post-1984 period (after the
patenting surge), but not before, when patents were relatively unimportant in these industries. Also,
the value of patent rights in complex product industries (where each product relies on many patents
held by a number of other firms) is much higher for entrants than incumbents in the post-1984
period. For discrete product industries (where each product relies on only a few patents, and where
the importance of patents for appropriability has traditionally been higher), there is no difference
between incumbents and entrants.
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1  Introduction 
A number of researchers have explored the reasons behind the recent rapid growth of  
patenting worldwide and especially in the United States (Kortum and Lerner 1995, 2003; Hall and 
Ziedonis 2001; Kim and Marschke 2004). Various explanations for the phenomenon have been 
offered: using aggregate US and international patent data, Kortum and Lerner attribute most of the 
growth to increases in innovation and improvements in the management of R&D. Using data on 
U.S. firms during the 1983-1992 period, Kim and Marschke attribute the growth to increases in 
R&D in certain sectors as well as to increased patent yield in the computing, electronics, and auto 
sectors. Hall and Ziedonis study a single industry, semiconductors, where the patenting per R&D 
rate doubled over ten years and find that the increase is associated with the assembly of large patent 
portfolios in order to forestall hold-up by rivals in the industry that own patents on technology that 
is necessary for the manufacture of semiconductor chips. Although there is no complete agreement 
among these authors as to the reasons for the increase, there is some consensus that the increase in 
patent yield is largely concentrated in computing and electronics, which suggests either that R&D 
has become more “fertile” in those industries or that something else having to do with patent 
strategy has changed.  
 
The growth in patenting has also renewed economists’ interest in evaluating the effectiveness 
of the patent system in promoting innovative activity among private firms. Although evidence on 
the effectiveness of patents for securing the returns to innovation is mixed (see the survey evidence 
reported by Cohen et al 2000 and the summary of empirical work in this area in Hall 2003a), one 
area where patents are widely viewed as important if not essential is for securing the financing to 
start a new venture (e.g., see the evidence from semiconductor firms in Hall and Ziedonis 2001). 
The current paper probes the empirical validity of this assertion by examining the comparative 3 
market valuation of patents held by incumbent and entrant firms in the United States during the 
1980s, a period in which the use of patents by U.S. firms increased very substantially, partly as a 
result of changes in the enforceability of patents in the courts.  
 
As several authors have demonstrated, the creation of a centralized court of appeals 
specializing in patent cases in 1982, together with a few well-publicized infringement cases in the 
mid-1980s, have led to an increased focus on patenting by firms in industries where patents have not 
traditionally been important, such as computers and electronics. In the first part of the paper I show 
that the decomposition of the sources of patent application growth in the United States supports the 
interpretation that the growth has been driven by increased patenting by U.S. firms in the electric 
machinery, electronics, and instrument industries, broadly defined. I also show that a time series 
analysis of patents reveals a very significant structural break between 1983 and 1984, one that was 
concentrated in the electrical sector, and more particularly, that firms in that sector (broadly defined 
to include electric machinery, electronics, instruments, computers, and communication equipment) 
increased their patenting across all technologies, accounting for essentially all the growth in 
patenting by US firms.  
 
Using a large sample of publicly traded U. S. manufacturing firms, I then investigate how 
their patent valuations changed between the early and late 1980s, focusing on the differences 
between incumbent firms and new entrants to the industry. I am able to confirm that after the mid-
1980s, patents held by entrants to the publicly traded sector are indeed more highly valued than 
those held by incumbents. An industry decomposition of this effect shows that it is concentrated in 
what Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2001) label complex product industries, which are industries where 
a single products can contain intellectual property covered by thousands of patents held by hundreds 
of patentholders. In such industries, patent portfolios often serve the defensive function of 
facilitating cross-licensing negotiations, rather than the traditional role of excluding competitors and 
securing the ownership of particular inventions. Although patent yield per se is not valued for 
incumbents in any of the industries, I show that in complex product industries there has been a 
strong positive shift in valuation for entrants as we enter the pro-patent era.  
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2  Changes in the U.S. patent system 
A number of changes to the patent system, both legislative and via legal precedent, took 
place during the 1980s and more recently. These changes are summarized in Table 1. A series of 
court decisions have expanded legitimate subject matter to include genetically-modified organisms, 
software, and business methods.2 Legislative changes have enhanced the ability of patentholders to 
enforce their patents, both via the creation of a specialized patent court, and via various procedural 
changes made at the same time. The Hatch-Waxman Act made patents even more important than 
they had been for pharmaceutical companies seeking to block generics from entering the market, by 
extending the lifetime of their drug patents to compensate for delays in regulatory approval.  
 
Following these legislative changes, the demonstration effect of  a series of infringement 
cases had a powerful effect on the thinking of some firm managers. The Kodak-Polaroid case 
mentioned in the table ultimately cost Kodak a billion dollar judgment and shut down their instant 
camera business in 1986. It also demonstrated that the ability of a patentholder to obtain an 
injunction against the use of the supposedly infringing technology well before damages were 
awarded was a powerful financial weapon, and one to be avoided even at considerable cost. Fear of 
this strategy appears to have been a strong motivation for increased defensive patent filings, at least 
in the semiconductor industry (Hall and Ziedonis 2001).  
 
The result of all these events was a rapid increase in patent applications. In the next section 
of the paper I study the timing and composition of this increase in some detail.  
2.1  The patent explosion 
Figure 1 shows the number of applications and grants for all U.S. utility patents from 1953 
to 2003. In addition it shows granted patents by application date for patents granted between 
                                                 
2 The “extension” of patentable subject matter to business methods is of course too late to have any effect on the data 
considered in this paper, but it is included for the sake of completeness, and because it is in some sense a consequence 
of the pro-patent shift of the 1980s and the creation of the CAFC. 5 
January 1965 and December 2002.3 Because of grant-application lags, the data on grants by 
application date are only complete through 1997. Figure 2 shows growth rates for the same data, 
smoothed using a moving average. Both graphs exhibit a substantial break in the mid-1980s: until 
then, patenting is roughly constant and after that it grows around five per cent per year. Real R&D 
increased only about 2.4% per year during the late 1980s so that patents taken out by U.S. inventors 
per R&D dollar also increased.  
 
For further investigation, I focus on the patent grants by date of application (which is 
relevant date for an investigation of firm behavior and abstracts from variations in the application-
grant lag). The properties of the patent application series were explored in two ways: first I tested for 
structural breaks both in the aggregate and by region and main technology class. Then I performed a 
growth accounting exercise over different 5-year subperiods to identify the sources of the growth 
displayed in the graphs.  
2.2  Tests for structural breaks 
Table 2 displays the results for the aggregate patent application series. Four different 
versions of the series were used, two in levels and two in changes, in both cases in absolute values 
and in logarithms. The presence of a unit root was clearly accepted for the two series in levels, so 
further analysis was conducted on the differenced series. The next row of the table shows the results 
of a simple t-test for a change in the mean of the differenced series between 1983 and 1984 (the 
choice of period was based on inspection of the graph in Figure 1). Either in levels or logs, this test 
rejects a constant mean resoundingly. The growth rate of patent applications jumps in 1984 from an 
average of 0.3 per cent per annum to an average of 6.9 per cent per annum. The final rows of the 
table give Andrews (1993) test for a structural break of unknown date. This too is highly significant, 
and in the case of the logged series, the break year is identified as 1984. Therefore further analysis in 
this section is conducted only on the first-differenced log of patent applications. 
                                                 
3 The apparent dip and rise in applications between 1995 and 1996 is due to accelerated filing, primarily by 
pharmaceutical firms who wished to obtain the traditional 17 year lifetime from date of patent grant that was changed in 
1996 to 20 years from date of filing. This caused a number of applications to be moved forward to the extent that was 
feasible. Patent applications in Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg technology class 31 (drugs) actually rose 45 per cent in 1995 and 
fell 45 per cent in 1996!  6 
 
Tables 3A and 3B show the results of tests for a structural break in patent applications by 
region of patent application origin, and technology class. The regional breakdown reveals 
unambiguous evidence of a structural break for U.S. origin patents in 1984. The remaining evidence 
is more ambiguous: Europe and the other developing countries have a marginally significant  
structural break according to the Andrews test, in 1993 and 1984 respectively. Although the other 
regions have no identifiable break, all but the Asian-origin patents have significantly different 
patenting growth rates before and after 1984. The conclusion is that the highly visible increase in 
growth rates in 1983/1984 is primarily due to inventors resident in the U.S.  
 
In Table 3B, I show similar results for the six broad technology categories developed by 
Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2002. The results are unambiguous: chemicals and pharmaceuticals, the 
industries that have traditionally identified patents as important for securing returns to innovation, 
exhibit little evidence of a structural break in 1984 or any other year. On the contrary, the electrical, 
computers and communications, mechanical and other technologies all have a significant structural 
break that occurs in 1984 or 1993 in the case of computers. Beginning in 1984, the growth of patent 
applications increased about 8-9 per cent per annum in computing and electrical technologies, and 
about 6 per cent per annum in mechanical and other technologies. The next section of the paper 
probes the contribution of these sectors to the aggregate growth in patenting in more detail.  
2.3  Accounting for patent growth 
In order to carry out a simple growth accounting exercise on the patent data, I define the 
following:  
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Figures 3 to 5 show the results of the computations for three difference decompositions of 
the data, by major region of patent origin, and then by broad technology class and broad industry 
class based on the Compustat firm sample that I use later in the paper. Both of the later breakdowns 
are for U.S.-origin inventors only, because of the evidence that this is the source of the patent 
increase and because I am unable to perform an industry class decomposition on those patents 
(unassigned and foreign) for which I do not have ownership information. The plots in Figures 3 to 5 
show sit-1 git  for the three different decompositions.  
 
The figures reveal the following interesting fact: although the jump in patent applications 
within the U.S. occurred in all technology classes, when we look by broad industry class, we find that 
it occurred only in firms that are in the electrical, computing and instruments industries. That is, the 
increase in chemicals, mechanical and other technologies appears to have been driven by increasing 
patenting activity by firms that were not traditionally in these industries. This result is consistent 
with the view that there has been a major strategic shift in patenting in the electrical/computing 
industries, but not in other industries.  
 
One interpretation of the contrasting findings in Figures 4 and 5 is the following: the first 
figure suggests an increase in innovation (as measured by patents) from the 1974-84 period to the 
1984-94 period that occurred in all technology areas. But the second says that the increase was 
actually concentrated in firms in one sector, which implies that these firms increased their patenting 
not only in their own sector but in the other technology sectors as well. This suggests that the 
increase is due to a strategic shift within the electrical and computing sector, rather than an increase 
in inventiveness across the board. Further testing of this hypothesis seems warranted, to understand 
what the patenting behavior of the electrical/computing firms was in the chemicals/ mechanical/ 
other sector before and after the shift in 1984.  
2.4  What changed? 8 
Given these findings with respect to timing of the surge, region of origin, and technology 
and industry origin, we can identify the following changes in the patent system as having provided 
an impetus for the increase in growth rate: the 1982 creation of CAFC and the litigation success of 
Texas Instruments against a number of firms in 1985/86 and Polaroid against Kodak in 1986. As a 
result of the creation of CAFC and as demonstrated by these cases, patents were now more likely to 
be upheld in litigation, and the consequences were likely to be more negative for alleged infringers, 
especially in complex product industries like electronic computing and communications.  
 
In Ziedonis and Hall (2001) we reported the results of our interviews with patent counsel 
and CEOs at a number of semiconductor manufacturing firms.4 The interviewees emphasized the 
important “demonstration effect” of Polaroid’s successful patent infringement suit against Kodak; in 
1985, the district court found Kodak liable for infringement and this decision was affirmed by the 
CAFC in 1986, barring Kodak from competing in the instant-film camera business. In 1989/1990 
the damages portion of the case was tried, ultimately settling for almost one billion dollars.5 The 
large penalties imposed in this case and the realization that US courts were willing to take an 
aggressive stance against infringement by halting—either temporarily or permanently—production 
utilizing infringed technologies fueled concerns among executives in many firms, including 
semiconductor manufacturers, for whom it would be very costly to shut down a wafer fabricating 
plant for even a week.  
 
The other widely-cited reason for intensified patenting in the industry was Texas 
Instruments’ patent royalty strategy. During 1985-86, Texas Instruments successfully asserted its 
patents in court for a range of inventions pertaining to integrated circuits (e.g., the “Kilby patent” on 
the basic design of the integrated circuit) and manufacturing methods (e.g., the method for 
encapsulating chips or transporting wafers from one manufacturing platform to another). Although 
the original suits were against non-US (Japanese) firms, TI’s successful enforcement of its patents 
enabled the firm to charge higher royalty rates to other firms in the industry. Indeed, our 
                                                 
4 The next two paragraphs are largely drawn from Ziedonis and Hall (2001). 
5 I am grateful to Cecil Quillen, who was patent counsel for Kodak during that period, for these precise recollections of 
the events in the case. 9 
interviewees were well aware of the strategies that Texas Instruments had put in place to manage—
and profit from—its patent portfolio;6 representatives from several firms plan to adopt a similarly 
aggressive licensing strategy once their portfolios grow larger. Others noted that AT&T, IBM, and 
Motorola began asserting their patent rights more aggressively during this period in order to increase 
licensing revenues based on their large portfolios of semiconductor-related patents. According to 
several industry representatives, these large patent owners not only increased royalty rates for “rights 
to infringe” their patents but sought royalty-bearing licenses from smaller firms more aggressively. 
 
As Levin et al (1987) and Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) reported from their survey 
evidence, patents have not been considered the most important means for appropriating returns to 
R&D except in the pharmaceutical industry, although they are considered effective for over one 
third of innovations in several other industries: paper, chemicals, metal products and machinery, 
computers and electrical equipment, medical equipment, and autos. Cohen et al. probe this question 
further and find that when industries are divided into those producing discrete products and those 
producing complex products, important differences in the reasons for using patents emerge.7 
Industries with discrete products tend to patent for the traditional reasons of excluding competitors 
and preventing litigation, whereas those in complex product industries are significantly more likely 
to patent for cross-licensing and trading/negotiation purposes, as well as to prevent litigation.  
 
Their evidence agrees with the Ziedonis and Hall finding that patents are now primarily used 
for defensive purposes in semiconductors, to protect against litigation and for cross licensing. But 
we also found that patents were considered important for securing financing for startups in this 
industry. The analysis in this section confirms that the overall surge in patenting is due to an 
increased use of patents by U.S. firms in industries similar to and including semiconductors, that is, 
in complex product industries. The next section explores the implications of this finding for firm 
valuation by the market, and attempts to shed light indirectly on the financing hypothesis.  
                                                 
6 After launching its more aggressive patent licensing strategy in 1985, TI subsequently earned almost $2 billion in 
royalty income during 1986-1993 (Grindley and Teece 1997). 
 
7 The former group includes food, textiles, paper, chemicals, drugs, metals and metal products, and the latter consists of 
machinery, computers, electrical equipment, electronic components, instruments, and transportation equipment. 10 
 
3  The market value of patents 
The findings in the previous section of the paper, together with the evidence in Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001) and Cohen et al. (2000) suggest that the value of patents to the firm may differ 
depending on the use to which they are put. That is, if patents are primarily valued because having a 
large number assists in cross-licensing negotiations and serves as insurance against threats from 
other patentholders, the individual patents in the portfolio may not be valued separately from the 
fact that they are a natural consequence of the firm’s R&D. That is, once we control for the level of 
R&D in a market value equation, there may be no additional effect arising from patenting. In 
particular, firms in sectors with complex product technologies should show such an effect, because 
in general it is the number of patents rather than the quality of each one that is relevant for defense, 
at least according to the Ziedonis-Hall interviewees.  
 
At the same time, if patents help to secure financing for entry, we expect that firms who 
have recently entered the publicly traded sector would have a patent portfolio that is more valuable 
on average than that held by other firms. That is, their R&D will have been differentially successful, 
compared to the incumbent firms. So the hypothesis is that patents will be related to the market 
value of these firms, above and beyond the value from their R&D effort. In addition, I would expect 
this differential to be largest in complex product industries. 
 
In this section of the paper I test these hypotheses using a simple market to book value 
equation at the firm level that includes the R&D assets to tangible assets ratio, the patent stock to 
R&D assets ratio, a dummy for firms that do not report R&D, and year dummies to account for 
overall market movements. The equation is estimated for two subperiods, 1980-1984 and 1985-
1989, and for incumbents entrants during the two periods separately. I then go on to estimate 
equations separately for firms in the three different technology classes used in the previous section 
(electrical, chemical, and mechanical), and for the discrete product/complex product breakdown 
suggested by Cohen et al. (2000).  
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 Finally, I use a differences in differences approach to examine whether the differential 
valuation of patents for entrants and incumbents in complex product industries increased relative to 
that for discrete product industries between the first and the second half of the 1980s. Finding that 
this is so is confirmatory evidence that strategies in those industries shifted, partly as a result of 
changes in patent enforcement around the middle of the 1980s.  
3.1  Data sample 
The data sample used here is drawn from the sample described in Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2002, 2004). It consists of about 1400 U.S. manufacturing firms with at least one patent 
and at least five years of data between 1980 and 1989, for a total of 9705 observations. Firms are 
divided into three groups:  incumbents (in the sample as of 1979), entrants 1980-84, or entrants 
1985-89. Note that being an entrant means that the number of shareholders in the firm was large 
enough for it to command sufficient investor interest to be followed by Standard and Poor’s 
Compustat, which basically means that the firm is required to file 10-Ks to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission on a regular basis. It does not necessarily mean that the firm has just gone 
through an IPO, although for some of these firms that will be true. Most of them are listed on 
NASDAQ or the NYSE. 
 
A table in Appendix A shows the industrial breakdown of these firms, and the way I classify 
their technologies for the tests later in this section. Not surprisingly, the industries with the highest 
entry rate during the period are the science-based industries in either chemical or electrical 
technologies: Medical Instruments, Computing Equipment, Instruments and Communication 
Equipment, and Pharmaceuticals. These four industries account for slightly over half of all entry 
during the period.  
3.2  Model and estimation strategy 
The model estimated is a very basic hedonic market value model, similar to that in Griliches 
1981 or Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2004. The market value of a firm is related to the book value of 
its assets via the following regression equation: 
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V = market value of firm 
A = book value of tangible assets 
K = stock of R&D assets  
P = stock of patents 
 
The form of the specification is dictated by the fact that patents are roughly proportional to 
R&D for these firms, so that the separate impact of obtaining a patent successfully can be measured 
by including a patent productivity variable in the form of patents per R&D in the model. The stocks 
of both R&D and patents are constructed from the past R&D and patent applications history using 
a 15 per cent depreciation rate.  
 
The method of estimation is ordinary least squares with standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation reported.8 In estimation, the slopes and the full set of time 
dummies δt are allowed to vary across the type of firm, whether incumbent or entrant, the time 
period (1980-84, or 1985-89), and the technology category (in three groups, electrical, chemical, and 
mechanical, or two, discrete and complex).  
3.3  Comparing Incumbents and Entrants 
A summary of the results of these estimations is shown in Table 4, which displays the patent 
coefficient for all firms and for the two different industry breakdowns. Several things emerge from 
these tables: first, during the 1980 to 1984 period, having a higher patent productivity from R&D is 
not associated with an increase in market value. On the contrary, it is slightly negatively valued in 
electrical and chemical industries, and especially negative among entrants in the chemical sector. 13 
This latter result no doubt reflects the collapse of biotechnology valuations that occurred during this 
period. Except for this sector, there is no difference between incumbents and entrants in the 
valuation of patent per R&D yield during the first half of the 1980s. 
 
However, during the 1985-1989 period, the patent yield of entrants in the electrical and 
mechanical sectors is valued at a substantial premium over incumbent firms, after controlling for 
their tangible and R&D assets. The difference is most stark when I distinguish between industries 
with discrete product technologies and those with complex product technologies. In the latter 
sector, having one additional patent per million dollars of R&D investment yields a market value 
boost of 25 per cent for newly entered firms.   
 
Third, there is a significant difference between the two periods. In the first, patent 
productivity is valued negatively or not at all by the market, whether the firm is an incumbent or an 
entrant. In the second period, after the changes in the patent environment have taken place, patent 
productivity remains negative or insignificant for the value of the incumbent firms, whereas it is now 
significant and positive for firms in the electrical and mechanical industries; the differences are even 
more striking for the discrete/complex split. The last line of Table 4 shows the differences in 
differences estimate of the difference between incumbents and entrant firms in the two periods. The 
differences are most significant for the chemicals sector, where the patent valuation for entrants rose 
from quite negative to slightly positive, and for the complex products industry, where the patent 
valuation for entrants rose from zero to very positive.  
 
Because it appears from Table 4 that the discrete/complex split is more informative for 
patent yield valuation than the technology split, I present the complete results for this split in Table 
5, for the two periods and for the incumbent/entrant split in each, in order to look more carefully at 
the differences in results for the two sectors. The discrete product industries show the following 
pattern in both periods: first, firms that enter tend to have a substantial premium (about 100 per 
cent above that predicted by their assets), but R&D assets are valued less for entrants than for 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 GMM in TSP 5.0 was used for estimation, in order to obtain the correct standard errors, but with instruments identical 14 
incumbents. At the same time, not having R&D is valued very negatively. What this suggests is that 
entry in this sector during the period essentially requires having R&D assets, so some of the 
valuation is absorbed by the entry dummy. This can occur because R&D assets are an error-ridden 
measure of the underlying value of the firm’s knowledge base. I also note that the patent yield from 
these assets has no impact on firm value for firms in this sector.  
 
The results for the complex product industries are quite different: First, the results for the 
two periods are quite different, with both R&D and patent yield valued significantly more highly for 
entrants in the second period. During the first period, only entry itself receives a valuation premium 
over incumbent firms (of about 50 per cent) and not doing R&D is somewhat negative for entrants. 
During the second period, the value of the incumbents’ R&D has fallen, whereas that for the 
entrants remains about the same. And as we saw earlier, there is a substantial premium for entrants 
that have a higher patent yield. Hall (1993) reviews the reasons for the decline in R&D valuation 
during this period and shows that is was concentrated in rust belt industries (e.g., metals and 
automobiles) and in large scale mainframe and mini computer firms, both of which were subject to 
restructuring during the 1980s due to the advent of the personal computer and the rise in global 
competition. Many of these industries are in the complex product sector.  
 
Thus these regressions provide some support for the hypothesis that patents may serve 
differing functions for incumbents and entrants in complex product industries, and that this 
difference may have emerged in the wake of the changes to the functioning of the U.S. patent 
system during the early to mid-1980s. Although the division into discrete and complex product 
industries is admittedly rather coarse, it seems to be revealing of a considerable difference in the role 
of patents.  
4  Conclusions 
This paper has established several facts about changes in the patenting behavior of U.S. 
firms during the past twenty years, some more precisely and robustly than others. First, there is clear 
                                                                                                                                                             
to the right hand side variables. 15 
evidence of a structural shift to a higher growth rate in overall patenting in the United States 
between 1983 and 1984, one that is driven for the most part by U.S. firms, but with some 
contribution from Asia and Europe. Second, this shift is largely accounted for by firms in the 
electrical and computing technology sectors, although patenting by U.S. inventors has risen in all 
technology classes. Although R&D has also increased in this sector, this cannot explain the size of 
the increase in patenting.  In addition, patenting per R&D dollar has actually fallen in the chemicals 
sector broadly defined.  
 
These findings are subject to a couple of competing explanations: one is that of Kortum and 
Lerner (1998, 2003), who argue that the management of R&D has improved during the period and 
who find that innovative activity has risen as much as patenting, at least in the pages of the Wall 
street Journal. The second is that the growth in patenting is largely driven by the needs of players in 
complex product industries for large patent portfolios and their consequent drive to obtain patents, 
even those of dubious quality, that is, even those that they have no intention of enforcing. The 
results thus far cannot really distinguish these two hypotheses, although we can say that if R&D 
management has improved, it is only in some sectors (electrical, etc.) and not in all.  
 
The results in the second part of the paper provide some limited support for the view that 
that patent rights themselves are not valuable assets, once we know the amount of investment that 
went into obtaining the innovation, but that they may be important for new entrants. That is, a 
possible interpretation of these results is the following: in established firms, accumulating patents for 
defensive reasons has little impact on market value because the past history of R&D spending is 
already a good indicator of the firm’s technology position. In fact, an above average accumulation of 
patents could be slightly negative for value if it indicates the present of threatened suits for 
infringement.  
 
On the other hand, for new entrants, especially in complex product industries like 
electronics where patents were previously unimportant, ownership of patents may have become an 
important signal of viability, especially because these firms have a median intangible to tangible asset 
ratio of above one half. That is, as the venture capitalists argue when considering funding these 16 
firms earlier in the life cycle process, patents are essential to provide a claim on the most important 
asset of the firm, its knowledge capital. In the market value equation, this translates into a premium 
for high patent productivity, especially post-1984.  
 
Some questions remain unanswered in this paper. First and foremost, what happened during 
the 1990s? Did the positive premium for entry with patents continue during the rapid growth of the 
computing and electronics sector in the late 1990s? Has the growth in patenting continued to be due 
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Figure 4

































































Accounting for U.S. Inventor Patent Application Growth 





























































Major Changes to the U.S. Patent System 
Year  Event or case  Result 
1980  Diamond v Chakrabarty  patentability of artificially 
engineered genetic organisms 
1980  Bayh-Dole legislation  increase in university patenting 
1981  Diamond v Diehr  patentability of software 
1982  legislation  Creation of CAFC; patent validity 
more likely to be upheld 
1984  Hatch-Waxman Act  increased importance of patents 
for drug firms vis a vis generic 
producers 
1985/6  TI sues Japanese 
semiconductor firms 
wins suits; turns to suing U.S. 
semiconductor firms, funding 
R&D from licensing royalties 
1986  Kodak-Polaroid  Decision on instant camera 
patent; final injunction against 
Kodak leading to $1B judgment 
1994  TRIPS agreement  harmonization drive begins 
1998  State Street and ATT vs. 
Excel 
















logs of pat 
applications
Weighted symmetric unit 
root test 0.69 0.03 -5.08 -5.03
  p-value 0.9998 0.9987 0.0002 0.0002
T-test on break between 
1983 and 1984 40026 (7177) .445 (.067) 7376 (1809) .069 (.014)
  p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Andrews (1993) test for 
unknown structural break 
(T=32) 86.1 126.1 21.8 23.0
  p-value <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01
Break year chosen by 
Andrews test  1989 1988 1993 1984
Tests for Unit Roots and Structural Breaks 
in Patent Application Series
USPTO patent applications 1967-1997 that were granted by 2002
Table 222 
 
Statistic USA Europe Asia & Japan
Other 
Developed Other
Total patents 1,499,517 533,614 461,575 71,688 6,445
T-test on break between 
1983 and 1984 .084 (.018) .037 (.019) -.000 (.029) .063 (.021) .101 (.039)
  p-value 0.000 0.068 0.990 0.006 0.016
Andrews (1993) test for 
structural break at unknown 
point (T=31) 27.14 8.93 6.84 8.86 7.23
  p-value <.01 <.05 >.10 <.05 >.10
Break year chosen by 





& comm. Electrical Mechanical Other
Total patents 542,700 219,257 325,665 470,463 604,679 568,489
T-test on break between 
1983 and 1984 .045 (.023) .035 (.040) .090 (.023) .075 (.014) .059 (.013) .058 (.011)
  p-value 0.041 0.378 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Andrews (1993) test for 
structural break at unknown 
point (T=31) 4.57 0.94 22.90 26.90 20.40 25.70
  p-value >.10 >.10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Break year chosen by 





& comm. Electrical Mechanical Other
Total patents 292,410 128,454 162,338 243,115 315,455 357,745
T-test on break between 
1983 and 1984 .049 (.024) .06 1(.041) .113 (.028) .084 (.014) .077 (.014) .071 (.012)
  p-value 0.052 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Andrews (1993) test for 
structural break at unknown 
point (T=31) 5.21 2.29 32.04 37.82 29.81 33.72
  p-value >.10 >.10 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01
Break year chosen by 
Andrews test  1987 1984 1987 1984 1984 1984
Tests for Structural Breaks by Region
Table 3A
Tests for Structural Breaks by Technology Class
Table 3B
Table 3C
Tests for Structural Breaks by Technology Class, US inventors only23 
 
Industry All Electrical Chemical Mechanical Discrete Complex
Number of obs
 (entrants) 5037 (652) 1720 (337) 1174 (103) 2143 (212) 2622 (276) 2312 (366)
    Incumbents -.026 (.011)** -.061 (.023)** -.040 (.016)** .005 (.014) -.025 (.014) -.027 (.023)
    Entrants -.022 (.036) .001 (.068) -.257 (.068)** .021 (.040) -.068 (.055) .001 (.046)
    Difference .004 (.038) .062 (.071) -.217 (.070)** .015 (.043) -.043 (.057) .037 (.052)
Number of obs
 (entrants) 4676 (537) 1824 (301) 1036 (85) 1821 (151) 2330 (233) 2256 (284)
    Incumbents .009 (.009) .013 (.011) -.072 (.043) .039 (.025) -.014 (.025) .014 (.010)
    Entrants .059 (.031) .192 (.058)** .013 (.010) .278 (.097)** .023 (.015) .272 (.062)**
    Difference .050 (.033) .179 (.059)** .085 (.044) .239 (.101)** .037 (.030) .258 (.063)**






















comp eq; elec 
mach; inst & 
comm; transport 
eq
**Significant at the 5% level




Coefficient of Patent stock/R&D stock24 
 
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
R&D Stock/ Assets 0.822 0.119** 0.429 0.120** -0.394 0.169** 0.554 0.072** 0.395 0.055** -0.160 0.090
Patent Stock/ R&D 
Stock -0.025 0.014 -0.068 0.055 -0.043 0.057 -0.014 0.025 0.023 0.015 0.037 0.030
D(no R&D) -0.012 0.039 -0.510 0.157** -0.498 0.162** 0.016 0.045 -0.440 0.108** -0.456 0.117**
Entrant dummy in first 
year 1.511 0.208** 0.802 0.203**




Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
R&D Stock/ Assets 0.559 0.079** 0.642 0.108** 0.084 0.133 0.251 0.042** 0.513 0.076** 0.263 0.086**
Patent Stock/ R&D 
Stock -0.027 0.023 0.010 0.038 0.037 0.052 0.014 0.010 0.272 0.062** 0.258 0.063**
D(no R&D) -0.047 0.068 -0.269 0.188 -0.222 0.200 -0.040 0.066 -0.002 0.158 0.038 0.170
Entrant dummy in first 
year 0.469 0.201** 0.225 0.133




Incumbents 1984 Entrants 1985-89 Entrants 1980-84




Standard error estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity and first order serial correlation.
Incumbents 1979 Entrants 1980-84 Incumbents 1984 Entrants 1985-89
538 545









0.609 0.264 0.639 0.204
1985-1989 1980-1984
Difference Difference
0.676 0.203 0.621 0.17625 
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Firms Entrants Obs. Electrical Chemical Mechanical Discrete Complex
Food & tobacco 58 10 420 420 420
Textiles & apparel 67 18 455 455 455
Lumber & wood 8 0 57 57 57
Furniture 31 5 231 231 231
Paper 48 6 351 351 351
Printing 27 5 218 218 218
Chemicals 63 10 512 512 512
Medical instruments 85 47 516 516 516
Pharmaceuticals & soap 71 28 519 519 519
Oil 25 3 203 203 203
Rubber & plastics 56 13 388 388 388
Stone, clay, and glass 24 3 163 163 163
Primary metals 53 13 376 376 376
Fabricated metals 85 19 543 543 543
Machinery & engines 158 38 1,162 1,162 1,162
Computing equipment 72 39 465 465 465
Electrical machinery 90 25 642 642 642
Instruments & comm. eq. 250 104 1,716 1,716 1,716
Transportation eq. 26 2 205 205 205
Autos & auto parts 47 9 378 378 378
Misc n.e.c. 30 8 185 185
Total 1,374 405 9,705 3,544 2,205 3,956 4,952 4,568
By Technology Base By Product Type
Sector Breakdowns (number of observations 1980-1989)
Appendix A
All